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THE POLITICAL MARKET FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE
Rachel E. Barkow*

In 2004, the number of individuals incarcerated in the United States ex
'
ceeded the two million mark. The current incarceration rate in the United
2
States is 726 �er 100,000 residents, the highest incarceration rate in the
4
Western world and a dramatic increase from just three decades ago. Not
only are more people serving time, but sentences have markedly length
5
ened.
W hat should we make of these trends? The answer has been easy for
most legal scholars: to them, the incarceration rate in the United States is
too high, and reforms are necessary to lower sentences. But many political
leaders and voters reach the opposite conclusion: current sentencing levels
are just right or, in some cases, not tough enough.
One way to assess these competing claims would be to agree on the pur
pose criminal punishment is supposed to serve and then to conduct an

*

Associate Professor, New York University School of Law. B.A. 1993, Northwestern; J.D.
1996, Harvard. -Ed. I thank Leslie Dubeck for superb research assistance.
I. At midyear 2004, there were 2, 131, 180 people incarcerated in prisons and jails in the
United States. PAIGE M. HARRISON & ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DE P'T OF JUSTICE, PRISON AND JAIL
INMATES AT MIDYEAR 2004, at 1 (2005), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/
pjim04.pdf.
2.

Id. at 2.

3.
THE SENTENCING PROJECT, NEW INCARCERATION FIGURES: GROWTH IN POPULATION
CONTINUES 1 (2005), available at http://www. sentencingproject.org/pdfs/1044.pdf. For country
incarceration rates, see Roy WALMSLEY, HOME OFFICE (U.K.), WORLD PRISON POPULATION LIST
(3d ed. 2002), available at http://www.homeoffice.gov.uk/rds/pdfs/r166.pdf. The United States
might have the highest incarceration rate in the entire world, but because reliable figures from China
are hard to come by, that is uncertain.
4. In 1985, there were 313 persons held in prisons and jails per 100,000 people in the popu
lation. DARRELL K. GILLIARD & ALLEN J. BECK, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, PRISON AND JAIL INMATES
AT MIDYEAR 1997, at 2 tbl.7 (1998), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/ascii/pjim97.txt.
5.

For example, among federal prisoners, the

[t]ime expected to be served, on average, increased from 26.9 months for offenders admitted
during 1988 to 44.4 months for offenders admitted during 2000 . For drug offenses, the amount
of time an incoming offender could expect to serve increased from 39.3 months to 61.6
months; for weapon offenses, expected time served increased from 32.4 months to 69.6
months.
BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. 0EP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL CRIMINAL CASE PROCESSING,
2000: WITH TRENDS 1982-2000 (2001), available at http://www. ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/
fccpOO.pdf. From 1993 to 1999, the average time served by state prisoners increased from forty-six
months to fifty-three months (an increase of 16 percent over six years). BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATIS
TICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2003, at 510 tbl.6.43
(2005), available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t643.pdf.
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empirical evaluation of how well current incarceration policies achieve that
purpose. The difficulty with this approach is readily apparent. To begin, the
purpose of punishment is highly contested. The purpose could be deter
rence,

incapacitation,

retribution, rehabilitation,

or

some

combination

thereof, and neither voters nor scholars agree on the proper metric. If that
alone were not a sufficient hurdle, there is also the thorny question of meas
uring effectiveness. Given the complexity of human behavior and social
dynamics, it is not easy to assess whether a particular sentence will deter or
rehabilitate offenders or whether it will cause a reduction in crime rates.
An alternative method for evaluating sentencing and incarceration poli
cies is to analyze the institutional dynamics that produce them. If the
political economy that produces sentencing laws suffers from an imbalance
or defect of some kind, that could provide a reason for questioning the sen

tencing policy itself. 6

The political-economy approach is the one that Doran Teichman takes in
7
his recent article The Market for Criminal Justice, and his piece shows the
promise of this method in assessing questions of criminal justice policy. As
Teichman points out, looking at criminal justice policy from this institu
tional perspective might reveal counterintuitive conclusions and shed new
light on important questions in criminal law, such as how to divide authority
among local, state, and federal jurisdictions and how to assess substantive
laws and sentences. This methodology is a welcome addition to the scholar
ship on the federalization of crime, and it will undoubtedly produce many
valuable insights. Teichman's inquiry is a prime example, for it demon
strates that there is, theoretically at least, a category of crimes for which
state competition might produce a race toward more severe sentences than
would be produced by a single central authority.
But Teichman's article also serves as a cautionary tale about the dangers
of taking an institutional approach without careful attention to the facts on
the ground. An evaluation of the political economy requires as much atten
tion to the political as it does to the economy, particularly before drawing
conclusions about how to allocate jurisdiction over crime policy between
state and federal authorities. At a minimum, one must carefully consider and
compare the politics of sentencing at both the state and federal levels before
making a claim that either has an advantage over the other. Teichman's arti
cle, however, considers only the incentives of state actors-and only some
of the incentives at that-and it is through that narrow lens that he reaches
"the conclusion that, contrary to the commonly held view among legal

6.
See Rachel E. Barkow, Federalism and the Politics of Sentencing, 105 CoLUM. L. REv.
1276 (2005) [hereinafter Barkow, Federalism] (using this methodology in comparing the political
processes of the states and the federal government in setting sentencing policy); Rachel E. Barkow,
Administering Crime, 52 UCLA L. REV. 715, 746-54 (2005) [hereinafter Barkow, Administering
Crime] (explaining that a factor in the movement toward insulated sentencing commissions was a
worry that the political process would not produce rational sentencing policy).
7.
Doron Teichman, The Market for Criminal Justice: Federalism, Crime Control, and
Jurisdictional Competition, 103 MICH. L. REv. 1831 (2005).
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scholars, additional federal regulation in the area of criminal justice might
be desirable to limit the inefficient harshening of that system caused by ju
risdictional competition."8
In this Essay, I will expand on Teichman's analysis to show that, while

his article offers an illuminating insight into the relationship among states
and should serve as a springboard for further research on the proper alloca
tion between state and federal authorities, his argument is incomplete: it
ignores political incentives at the state level that do not involve mobile
criminals and fails to consider the political economy of crime and sentenc
ing at the federal level. These additional factors undermine the strength of

Teichman's posited link between state competition and the rise in harsher
sentences and call into question his argument for greater federal involve
ment. Indeed, while Teichman is right that criminal law scholars should pay
more attention to institutional dynamics, the political-economy perspective

suggests that those seeking to curtail the trend toward harsh sentences
should seek to limit, not expand, federal involvement over crime. Teichman
reaches a contrary conclusion only by assuming a central authority that is
divorced from political pressure-an assumption that hardly describes Con
gress or the federal executive branch.
I. T H E TENUOUS LINK BETWEEN STATE COMPETITION
AND LONGER SENTENCES

One of Teichman's central insights is that jurisdictional competition may
create incentives for states to raise sentences under some circumstances in
order to shift criminal activity to neighboring jurisdictions. Teichman posits

that this creates an "arms race"9 that is partially responsible for the harshen
ing of sentences in recent years.10
While Teichman is likely correct on his narrow claim-that state compe
tition might be responsible for some increases in sentences-it is important
to emphasize just how small this category of sentences is likely to be and
how tenuous its relationship is to the incarceration boom and the trend to
ward

longer

sentences.

As

Teichman

himself

admits,

jurisdictional

competition will occur only under limited circumstances because "some
crimes are clearly local,"11 and the mobility of criminals is often hindered
2
because of costs.1 Indeed, Teichman concedes that only a handful of crimes

have produced concrete examples of displacement, and those crimes are

8.

Id. at 1835.

9.

Id. at 1834, 1839-40.

10.
Id. at 1835 (referring to the "inefficient harshening of [the criminal justice] system
caused by jurisdictional competition") (emphasis added).
11.
Id. at 1841; see also Lawrence Rosenthal, Policing and Equal Protection, 21 YALE L. &
PoL'Y REV. 53, 85 (2003) (noting that "crime is not geographically fungible" and observing that,

even when jurisdictions use geographically targeted policing, the displacement effect is limited).
12.

Teichman, supra note 7, at 1842.
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driven by profit motives. 13 Moreover, even in those limited instances, the
4
magnitude of a displacement effect has been "relatively small."1 Neverthe
less, relatively small does not necessarily mean relatively unimportant.
Teichman's article is therefore at its most valuable in alerting readers to the
potential for states to set sentences for some crimes with displacement in
mind.
The problem, however, is that Teichman often goes beyond his own
stated boundaries for when displacement-and thus a race-is likely to oc
cur, and that leads him to assume that jurisdictional competition is
responsible for sentencing increases in areas where a race is unlikely to be
the cause. A prime example of this is his claim that three-strikes laws might
be an outgrowth of state competition.1 5 As an initial matter, the sweep of
three-strikes laws belies the claim that they are concerned with mobile
crimes and criminals. Three-strikes laws do not cover only those crimes
driven by profit motives; indeed, they cover a wide range of violent and

nonviolent crimes. 16 Most violent crimes are impulsive and insensitive to
variation among jurisdictions, as Teichman admits, and many nonviolent
offenses are similarly local in nature.17 There is no reason to believe that
most crimes covered by three-strikes laws are "sensitive to the potential

13. Id. at 1840-41 (citing burglary, robbery, narcotics production and sales, and prostitution).
Of course, even with crimes that are predominantly profit-driven, the displacement story should not
be overstated. Individuals engaged in crime for profit often are committing crime to support a drug
habit. For instance, in 1996, one in four (25.6 percent) convicted property offenders serving time in
jail committed the offense to get money for drugs. CAROLINE WOLF HARLOW, U.S. DEP'T OF JUS
TICE, PROFILE OF JAIL INMATES 1996 (1998), available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/
pdf/pji96.pdf. Offenders are often under the influence of drugs or alcohol at the time of their profit
driven offense. For example, among state prisoners serving time for a property offense in 1997, 53.2
percent reported being under the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of the offense. Among
federal prisoners serving time for a property offense in 1997, 22.6 percent reported being under the
influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of the offense.Grouping all crime categories together, 51
percent of prisoners (52 percent of state and 34 percent of federal prisoners) reported being under
the influence of alcohol or drugs at the time of their offense. CHRISTOPHER J. MUMOLA, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, SUBSTANCE ABUSE AND TREATMENT OF STATE AND FEDERAL PRISONERS, 1997 (1999),
available at http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/satsfp97.pdf. Consequently, these offenders are
not necessarily thinking rationally before they act, so they might not be sensitive to jurisdictional
differences in sentencing.
14. Teichman, supra note 7, at 1842; see also David M. Kennedy, Pulling Levers: Chronic
Offenders, High-Crime Settings, and a Theory of Prevention, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 449, 474 n.56
(1997) ("Much research shows that displacement is seldom total and often inconsequential.").

15. Teichman, supra note 7, at 1847-48 ("[S]ome criminals will find it beneficial to relocate
their activity from states that adopted three-strikes Jaws to those that did not.").
16. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 35-50-2-8.5 (2004) (imposing enhancements for third seri
ous felon and defining a serious felony to include murder, rape, dealing in cocaine, and burglary
with a deadly weapon, id. § 35-50-2-2(b)(4)); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 12-19-21 (2002) (allowing for
twenty-five-year discretionary enhancement for any third felony conviction); W. VA . CODE ANN.
§ 61-11-18 (LexisNexis 2005) (providing for a life sentence for any third felony conviction punish
able by confinement in a penitentiary); Ewing v. California, 538 U.S. 11, 48 (2003) (Breyer, J.,
dissenting) (discussing the breadth of California's three-strikes law, which is triggered by a wide
range of conduct).
17. Teichman, supra note 7, at 1841 n.55 (citing authority for the proposition that "crimes of
passion tend not to be displaced").
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costs and benefits of relocating," undermining the claim that jurisdictional
8
competition was the motivating factor behind the laws.1 Teichman's use of
sex offender registration and notification laws suffers from a similar short
coming. Sex offenses are rarely crimes motivated by profit, and Teichman's
sparse anecdotal evidence fails to demonstrate that most or even many sex

offenders are responsive to these laws and therefore leave jurisdictions to
avoid them.19 His invocation of laws imposing collateral consequences on
20
convicted offenses, such as the removal of some occupational licenses,
falls short for the same reasons. These laws typically cover all types of fel
ons-including those who commit impulsive crimes and who do not have
21

much mobility.

The federal government's adoption of these same laws further under
mines the claim that jurisdictional competition motivated three-strikes
sentencing provisions, sex-offender notice and registration laws, or laws
imposing collateral punishments on convicted felons. If three-strikes laws
result from a desire to push offenders to neighboring jurisdictions, why
22
would the federal government pass similar legislation? If sex-offender reg
istration laws spring from interstate competition and lead to a race to ever
harsher requirements, what explains the fact that Congress passed one of the
toughest such laws in the country and reduces federal law enforcement
funding to any state that fails to enact legislation with certain notification
and registration requirements?23 If there is a race, why would the federal

18. Id. at 1842. Teichman's anecdotal evidence-which consists of hearsay, political postur
ing, and some stray quotes by state officials-is weak evidence to the contrary and offers no insights
on how many individuals covered by these laws are likely to respond to them by relocating. Id. at
1847-48.
19. Again, Teichman's evidence consists of a few quotes and isolated incidents published in
newspaper accounts. Id. at 1854-55 nn. 131-32.
20.

Id. at 1853.

21. See, e.g., SUSAN M. KUZMA, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CIVIL DISABILITIES OF CONVICTED
FELONS: A STATE-BY-STATE SURVEY (1996), available at http://www.usdoj.gov/pardon/
forms/state_survey.pdf (listing several states that allow revocation of professional licenses as a result
of any felony conviction).
22. See, e.g., Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e) (2000) (imposing
fifteen-year mandatory minimum sentence for individuals charged under § 922(g) with three prior
convictions for violent felonies or serious drug offenses); Violent Crime Control and Law Enforce
ment Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c) (2000) (mandating life imprisonment for defendants with
two prior violent felonies or more serious drug offenses); Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools
To End the E xploitation of Children Today (PROTECT) Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat.
650 (2003) (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C.S. § 3559(e) (LexisNexis 2005)) (two-strikes law
imposing life imprisonment for child sex offenders).
23. See Aimee's Law, 42 U.S.C. § 13713 (2000) (punishing a state whose sentences for
violent crimes are less than the national average or whose laws do not require offenders to serve at
least 85 percent of their sentences by reducing the federal law enforcement assistance funds it re
ceives if offenders sentenced in that state go on to commit certain offenses in other states); Jacob
Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually Violent Offender Registration Act, 42 U.S.C.
§ 14071 (2000) (imposing a 10 percent reduction of assistance grant funds on noncompliant states);
see also 18 U.S.C. § 4042(c) (2000) (requiring federal authorities to notify state authorities when a
federal sex offender is released or sentenced to probation); Pam Lychner Sexual Offender Tracking
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government need to set a floor? And if laws imposing collateral conse
quences for felons were responsive to displacement, why did the federal
4
government lead the way in enacting so many such lawsi
The answer to these questions seems obvious: these laws are not the by
product of jurisdictional competition but of political pressure within a
jurisdiction. Thus, while there is a political-economy story to tell about sen
tencing laws, it is not the one that Teichman advances. Voters and powerful
interest groups demand these laws, regardless of what neighboring jurisdic
tions are doing, and almost no influential interests stand in the way.25 Three
strikes laws, like other recidivist laws, respond to voter demands for tougher
sentences that the public believes will incapacitate offenders and deter them
from striking again or will make them pay even further for their crimes. 26
Prosecutors and those with an interest in the expansion of prisons also sup
port these laws, as do organizations such as the National Rifle Association
and victims' rights groups.27 Sex-offender notification and registration laws
likewise provide politicians with an opportunity to appear responsive to vot
ers' concerns about crime without losing the support of any important
constituency. These laws are as much about symbolism as they are about
any utilitarian goal, much less one that involves jurisdictional competition.
The same is true of collateral consequences. They express a social judgment
that those convicted of crimes are not entitled to the same benefits as every
one else, and they enable politicians to look proactive on crime without
much real effort. While Teichman recognizes that "(v]alues such as retribu
tion and fairness obviously play a significant role in shaping criminal
sanctions,"28 he sees these values acting as checks on, rather than instigators
of, the push for harsher sentences. But, in fact, the political climate today is
characterized by sentiment for tougher laws in the name of retribution and
.
29
JUSt deserts.

and Identification Act of 1996, 42 U.S.C. § 14072 (2003) (requiring registered sex offenders to
notify the FBI when moving to a new state).
24. See OFFI CE OF THE PARDON ATTORNEY, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, FEDERAL STATUTES
IMPOSING COLLATERAL CONSEQUENCES UPON CONVICTION, available at http://www.usdoj.gov/
pardon/collateral_consequences.pdf (last visited Mar. 19, 2006) (showing the breadth of collateral
consequences imposed by the federal government); Teichman, supra note 7, at 1853 n.120 ("[M)any
of the collateral consequences of criminal convictions were initiated by the federal government
. . . . ).
"

25.

For a more detailed discussion of the politics of sentencing, see Barkow, Administering

Crime, supra note 6, at 721-30. For an insightful discussion of the politics of criminal law, see
William J. Stuntz, The Pathological Politics of Criminal Law, 100 MICH. L. REV. 505 (2001).

26.
Indeed, Teichman's claim that legislatures passed these laws with the intent to prevent
offender migration is undermined by his own anecdotal evidence. He cites a California Department
of Justice study that found that the California law had the "unintended" consequence of prompting
parolees to leave the state. Teichman, supra note 7, at 1847 (emphasis added).
27.

Barkow, Administering Crime, supra note 6, at 729.

28.

Teichman, supra note 7, at 1863.

29.

See Barkow, Federalism, supra note 6, at 1278-79 & n.2; see also Gerard

E. Lynch,

Sentencing: Learning from, and Worrying About, the States, 105 COLUM. L. R.Ev. 933, 933 (2005)

("The late twentieth century saw wholesale changes in sentencing philosophy and practice. The
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These intrajurisdictional dynamics of voter and interest-group prefer
ences explain why the federal government's sanctions in the areas Teichman
explores are harsher than the respective state laws. If these laws were the
outgrowth of jurisdictional competition, one would expect federal sanctions
Jo
to be lower than state sanctions for similar crimes. These political pres
sures within a jurisdiction also explain why punishments have grown
harsher across the board and not just in those areas where scholars have
J'
found evidence of displacement. Further, it accounts for the fact that, while
the potential for state competition has existed since the formation of the Un

ion, it is only in recent decades that we have seen the massive push toward
incarceration and dramatic sentence increases. The constant of state compe
tition cannot explain the variability of sentencing patterns. But the changing
political and cultural climate within the United States as a whole does ac
count for the recent shift.

conventional wisdom about the primary purpose of sentencing shifted away from rehabilitation as a
.dominant philosophy and toward retribution or 'just deserts.'").
Teichman, supra note 7, at 1843 n.60. Teichman posits in a footnote that perhaps the
30.
federal sanctions are not really similar because the federal government is prosecuting more serious
versions of the same crime. Id. Yet the composition of federal prisoners as compared to state prison
ers belies that assertion. For instance, in 2000, only IO percent of federal inmates were incarcerated
for violent offenses, compared with 49 percent of state inmates. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL OFFENDERS STATISTICS, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/
crimoff.htm#inmates (last visited Feb. 13, 2006). Moreover, the trend in state prisons has been to
house more violent offenders, while the trend in federal prison is to house more drug offenders. See
id. ("Violent offenders accounted for 53% of the growth in State prisons between 1990 to 2000,
drug offenders accounted for 59% of the growth in Federal prisons."). And while Teichman is cor
rect that the federal government is not responsible as the primary regulator so it "can afford to
impose the severe sanctions it chooses to impose," Teichman, supra note 7, at 1843 n.60, that does
not explain why the federal government would choose to spend its funds on more severe sanctions
instead of something else.
31. It is not just auto theft or even drug sentences that have grown longer; rather sentences
for everything from domestic violence to murder to rape have increased. For example, the mean
time served for murder increased from 92 to 106 months from 1990 to 1999, and time served for
rape increased from 62 to 79 months over the same period. By comparison, time served for motor
vehicle theft increased from twenty to twenty-five months, and time served for fraud increased from
twenty to twenty-three months in that same time span. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T
OF JUSTICE, SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 2003, at 506 tt.637-38 (2005), avail
able at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/t637.pdf, http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/pdf/
t638.pdf; see also Sara Sun Beale, What's Law Got to Do with It? The Political, Social, Psychologi
cal and Other Non-Legal Factors Influencing the Development of(Federal) Criminal Law, 1 BuFF.
CRIM. L. REV. 23, 24 n.5 (1997) ("[M]ean sentence lengths across all offenses nearly doubled be
tween 1984 and 1990 . . . ." (citing 2 U.S. SENTENCING COMM'N, THE FEDERAL SENTENCING
GUIDELINES: A REPORT ON THE OPERATION OF THE GUIDELINES SYSTEM AND SHORT-TERM IM
PACTS ON DISPARITY IN SENTENCING, USE OF INCARCERATION, AND PRoSECUTORIAL DISCRETION
AND PLEA BARGAINING 378-81 (1991))). Because sentences have increased across all crimes, the
fact that sex-offender registration and notification laws have also grown more strict does not "vali
date[] the jurisdictional competition hypothesis," as Teichman claims. Teichman, supra note 7, at
1856. One would expect increasing severity because of the political economies within a jurisdiction,
regardless of what neighboring states are doing. That explains why the federal government has
consistently increased the punishment, notification, and registration requirement for sex offenders.
See Prosecutorial Remedies and Other Tools To End the Exploitation of Children Today
(PROTECT) Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-21, 117 Stat. 650 (2003) (codified as amended at 18
U.S.C.S. § 3559(e) (LexisNexis 2005)); supra note 23.

1720

Michigan Law Review

[Vol.104:1713

All this is not to say that displacement does not occur in limited circum
stances or that displacement might not play a minor role in producing some
sentencing increases. There might be examples where crime-location deci
sions are made on the basis of jurisdictional differences in sentences, and
states may then respond accordingly. But this is going to be the exception, not
the rule, in terms of explaining the broader trend of ever-longer sentences in

recent decades.
II. A CURE WOR S E T HAN THE DISEASE: FEDERAL AUTHORITY
OVER SENTENCING

Although jurisdictional competition is unlikely to be a major factor in
most state sentencing decisions, there will likely be limited areas where ei
ther real or perceived displacement plays a role in state decisions to alter
sentencing policy. This can lead to a race to the top, in which state competi
tion leads to innovations and better decisionmaking, or a race to the bottom,
in which states overspend on criminal-justice resources and produce sen
32
Even if one could marshal sufficient

tences that are harsher than necessary.

evidence that states are responding to other states in setting sentences, it
would be difficult to identify whether the race is to the top or to the bottom
3
and whether it produces sentences that are too harsh. 3 But assuming that
one could identify a situation in which state sentences were "too harsh" be
4

cause of displacement concerns, the next question is what to do about it.3

More specifically, would a race to the bottom justify federal legislative in
tervention, as Teichman suggests?
When thinking about how to allocate authority over criminal-justice
matters between state and federal jurisdictions, it is important to assess the
respective strengths and weaknesses of each. To the extent that a race among
states leads to inefficiently high sentences for some limited category of
crimes, that is a downside to state jurisdiction that should be factored into
the comparative analysis. But it is only one factor. It does not necessarily
follow that federal authority is a more attractive alternative because the fed
eral political process might have shortcomings of its own that are as bad as
or worse than the harms that might follow from jurisdictional competition.
Indeed, characteristics of the federal political process make it quite
likely that any intervention by Congress will yield results that are as harsh
as or harsher than state sentences. The federal government faces largely the
same interest group and voter pressures to appear tough on crime that the

32.

Teichman, supra note 7, at 1859-64.

Teichman suggests that the race to the bottom is characterized by putting too many re
sources into punishment. Id. at 1861. But this assumes that utilitarian goals are the only ones
motivating a state. S tates may prefer higher levels of punishment than a utilitarian calculus would
yield because of the retributive or expressive value of a harsher sentence.
33.

34.
Wayne Logan provides an illuminating analysis of Teichman's other solution, interstate
cooperation. See Wayne A. Logan, Crime, Criminals, and Competitive Crime Control, 104 MICH. L.
REV. 1733 (2006).

June 2006]

The Political Market

1721

states face. Moreover, unlike at the state level, there are fewer political
forces pushing in the opposite direction at the federal level. Groups repre
senting the interests of defendants are politically weak at all levels of
government, but it is more likely that advocates making arguments for
shorter sentences on the basis of cost concerns will have more sway at the
state level. States are more sensitive to sentencing costs because they make

up a larger portion of state budgets than they do of the federal budget and
3
because states cannot carry deficits to pay for their crime policies. 5 As a
result, state actors tend to see the budget in zero-sum terms, and crime ex

penditures are viewed with greater scrutiny because money saved on
incarceration costs could be spent elsewhere.
In addition, because the states are responsible for the entire range of
criminal conduct, there will be a greater disciplining effect on states than the
federal government, even if states are sentencing with mobile criminals in
mind. That is, because states will likely want an internally rational state
code-in which, for example, murder is treated more seriously than theft
there will be a limit on how much a state will raise sentences for theft, even
if those thefts involve mobile criminals. States will want to allocate their
limited budgets to make the most effective use of their resources, which
means that they are likely to reserve prison space for violent offenders.
These concerns will act as checks on any state impulse to raise sentences
because of displacement concerns, and they will also act as checks on other
demands for increased sentences. And to the extent that state actors are mo
tivated by these resource constraints and a desire for an efficient allocation
of resources among all crimes, those state actors will face a political process
that is more balanced than the one at the federal level.
That is because there are currently few disciplining effects on the federal
process that prompt a rational look at sentencing.36 The federal government
pays little attention to the costs of sentencing because incarceration costs
3
make up a small part of the federal budget, 7 and the full costs of a sentencing increase do not materialize until future years as the sentences are being
served. Because Congress does not have to produce a fiscal note before
passing legislation, those costs often go under the radar. There is little po
litical pressure to pay more attention to them because those competing for

federal resources do not view the federal budget in zero-sum terms and do

35. Barkow, Federalism, supra note 6, at 1300-03 (comparing the politics of sentencing
costs at the state and federal levels).
36.

For an expanded discussion of the federal politics of sentencing, see id. at 1299--1312.

37. Id. at 1301 (noting that federal spending on crime makes up just over I percent of the
federal budget); see also OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERN
MENT: HISTORICAL TABLES FISCAL YEAR 2006, OUTLAYS BY FUNCTION AND SUBFUNCTION: 19622010 (2005), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy06/sheets/hist03z2.xls (showing
that in fiscal year 2004, federal corrections accounted for slightly less than a mere quarter of a per
cent of total government spending for that year).
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not see federal crime expenditures as vulnerable targets in any event because

they are so politically popular. 38

Moreover, because the federal government has jurisdiction over a subset
of crime, the federal political process does not experience the disciplining
process that comes with the responsibility of being the front-line enforcer of
most criminal laws. Because Congress has limited jurisdiction, it does not
need to consider how federal offenses stack up against all other crimes. It
does not need to reserve the longest sentences for the most violent crimes,
such as murder and rape, because those crimes are largely handled at the
state level. The federal government therefore lacks the pressure that states
feel to devise a code that treats all crimes as a coherent whole.39 And be
cause limited jurisdiction means that the federal government maintains a
smaller police force than the states, Congress may have a greater incentive
than the states to use a strategy of increased sentences as opposed to in
4
creased likelihood of detection for improving deterrence. 0
There are, then, strong incentives for federal officials to pass laws with
longer sentences, and few factors that put pressure in the opposite direction.
This is not just a theoretical insight. Even in the areas of alleged jurisdic
tional competition highlighted by Teichman, we have seen that federal
intervention often involves a similarly harsh or even more severe sentence or
4
law. 1 And to the extent that Congress seeks to promote uniformity among
the states, it has passed laws that encourage the states themselves to enact
42
more stringent laws. Congress, for instance, passed the Anti Car Theft Act
of 1992, which provides enticements for states to pass auto-theft-prevention
laws like the ones Teichman criticizes as examples of inefficient laws pro
43
duced by jurisdictional competition. Similarly, Congress has passed laws
that create incentives for states to adopt strict notice, registration, and sen-.
44
tencing requirements for sex offenders. Thus, if the bottom to which states

38.

Barkow, Federalism, supra note 6, at 1302.

39. This may explain why the federal code itself has ballooned so dramatically in recent
years. Compare Tom Stacy & Kim D ayton, The Undeifederalization of Crime, 6 CORNELL J.L. &
Pua. PoL'Y 247, 251 & n.19 (1997) (estimating more than three thousand federal offenses), with
Stuntz, supra note 25, at 514-17 (listing representative state codes as having approximately five
hundred offenses and noting that "[f]ederal criminal law probably covers more conduct . . . than any
state criminal code").
40. See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. PoL. EcoN.
169, 178-85 (1968).
41.

See supra

text accompanying notes 22-24.

42. See, e.g., Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, 18 U.S.C. § 3559(c)
(2000) (providing incentive grants for states that require violent offenders to serve at least 85 per
cent of their sentences).
43. Teichman, supra note 7, at 1871 ("[T]he ACTA conditions states' eligibility for federal
grants on the creation of a state ATPA much like Michigan's.").
44. See Aimee's Law, 42 U.S.C. § 13713 (2000) (exempting a state from reimbursement
requirements for sex-offender prosecutions of its parolees in other states if it adopts certain mini
mum sentencing terms for sex offenders); Jacob Wetterling Crimes Against Children and Sexually
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are racing, according to Teichman, consists of ever-harsher sentences when
more lenient sentences would get the job done, advocating federal legisla

tion does not appear to be the solution.
CONCLUSION

Although jurisdictional competition is not a critical impetus for the sen
tencing increases of the modem era, it should not be overlooked as an
important dynamic. Doran Teichman therefore advances our knowledge of
the political economy of crime by highlighting how state competition might

operate to affect sentencing policies. More importantly, by taking a look at

the institutions

that

produce

sentencing

policy

and

their

incentives,

Teichman employs a methodology that holds great promise for our under
standing of the wisdom of substantive criminal law and sentencing.
But a closer look at the political economy of sentencing reveals that,
contrary to Teichman's argument, the federal government is not likely to
provide a solution to a state race to the bottom that produces overly harsh
sentences. That is because the current federal sentencing laws are not, as
Teichman asserts, the product of some kind of congressional "misunder
standing of the proper role of the federal government in designing crime
4
prevention policies" that could be corrected with more education. 5 Congress
does not "misunderstand" its role when it passes these laws. Rather, it does
not care about the extemality problem because that does not win members
of Congress votes. While a central planner could, in theory, correct negative
externalities of state competition-to the extent they exist-Congress is not
a theoretical central planner. It is a political body that responds to political
pressures. Because those pressures push for more severe sentences and there
is currently no political mileage to be had for forging compromises that re
quire states to set lower sentences, federal intervention will fail to provide a
correction for state competition that leads to overly-harsh sentences. In fact,
federal legislative intervention could exacerbate the problem, as it has in the
4
many areas Teichman explores. 6

Violent Offender Registration Program, 42 U.S.C. § 14071 (2000) (conditioning federal funding on
state adoption of certain minimal registration and notification requirements for sex offenders).
45.

Teichman, supra note 7, at 1871.

46.
These same criticisms do not apply to Teichman's suggestion that federal courts should
be playing a greater role in policing sentencing under the Eighth Amendment. Teichman, supra note
7, at 1869-70. Greater court involvement seems to address both the shortcomings of jurisdictional
competition that worry Teichman and the one-sided dynamic that pervades the federal and state
politics of sentencing.
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